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Civil Procedure
Drug Dealer Liability: A Potential Avenue of Recovery for Victims
of Illegal Drug Use
James N. Fincher
I. INTRODUCTION
"[D]rug use is on the rise in America today."' As the use of drugs escalates, the
number of people harmed by its effects increases as well? The threat of criminal
penalties has not convinced many sellers to give up their unlawful business? Law
enforcement does not have the requisite resources to find and prosecute all illegal
drug activity.4
The legislature intensified the war on drugs with the Drug Dealer Liability Act
by allowing victims to recover damages directly from the dealers, in the hopes of
deterring drug sales. Under current California law, a drug dealer is not responsible
to third parties for damages caused by the dealer's drug sales. The Drug Dealer
Liability Act is a reaction to this deficiency in California tort law. 7 With this act, the
legislature created a statutory cause of action against drug dealers for monetary,
noneconomic losses that users of controlled substances inflict upon their victims.8
1. Frank E. Lockwood, Drug Foes Brainstorm War Plans During Treasure Valley Summit, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Apr. 4, 1996, at lB (quoting U.S. Attorney Monte Stiles as saying "drug use is on the rise in
America"); see Gary Heinlein, The Drug Scourge, INDIANAPOLS STAR, Aug. 25, 1996, at D02 (revealing that a
"National Household Survey on Drug Abuse... by the Department of Health and Human Services found that drug
use among 12- to 17-year-olds doubled from 1992 to 1995" and that the recent trend is disturbing because the
country appears to have lost all that was gained in drug use reduction that occurred during the Reagan and Bush
administrations).
2. See Bills Signed, CITY NEws SERvICE OF L.A., Sept. 24, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (stating that in the neonatal unit at Glendale Adventist
Medical Center, a drug-addicted baby is born every ten days and the baby's care costs approximately $200,000).
3. SENATE COMMnTEE ON CRIMINALPROCEDURE, COMMITrEEANALYSIS OFSB 1754, at 2 (June 4, 1996).
4. Id.
5. Id.; see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11700-1 1717 (enacted by Chapter 867) (allowing victims of
drug abuse to recover damages from the dealers of drugs).
6. See Michael Bronfin, "Dram shop " Liability: Holding Drug Dealers Civilly Liable for Injuries to Third
Parties and Underage Purchasers, 1994 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 345, 346 (explaining that common law does not allow
third parties to recover damages from a drug dealer); see also CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714 (West Supp. 1997) (requiring
proximate cause to affix liability).
7. SeeSENATERuLEs Comm1EE, COMMmI*EEANALYS1sOFSB 1754, at 1-2 (June 17, 1996) (explaining
that existing law does not create a cause of action, but the legislature has created one by statute).
8. SENATE COMMITrEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDrRE, COMIrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1754, at 2 (June 11,
1996).
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The Uniform Controlled Substance Act makes it unlawful to sell or distribute
specified controlled substances. 9 Despite the fact that drugs are illegal, there are no
provisions within California's Health and Safety Code or Penal Code that address the
victims of drug abuse.' ° Current California law holds every person civilly liable for
injuries that are proximately caused by that person's negligence or willful acts." The
law prior to the enactment of this statute left only drug users liable for damages, and
they typically lacked the economic means to provide for adequate recovery, leaving
the innocent victim to bear the cost of the injuries. 2
The model legislation for the Drug Dealer Liability Act is the product of Daniel
Bent, a former U.S. Attorney from Hawaii.13 Mr. Bent, who studied the sociology of
drug use as well as negligence law and various market share theories, drafted the
statute after working with several other U.S. Attorneys on the prevention of drug
use. 4 In 1992, the American Legislative Exchange Council adopted Mr. Bent's
proposal as one of its model laws.' 5
II. THE CHANGE IN CALIFORNIA LAW
At common law, a drug dealer would not be held liable for damages suffered by
the drug user. 6 The drug dealer would also not be liable to third parties at common
law. 17 Statutory law regarding the relationship between an alcohol server and a
9. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11000 (West Supp. 1997); see SENATE COMM=rrEE ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1754, at 1 (June 11, 1996) (asserting that the Uniform Controlled
Substance Act makes the sale of the listed drugs illegal).
10. SENATE COMMITIONCRMNALPROCEDuRECCom=r ANALYSIS OFSB 1754, at 2 (June 4, 1996).
11. CAL CIV. CODE § 1714 (West Supp. 1997).
12. Bronfin, supra note 6, at 352; see id. (stating that victims would more likely be able to recover under
a dealer liability act).
13. ASSiMBLY FLOOR, CoMMrfrrEE ANALYSTS OF SB 1754, at 2 (Aug. 8, 1996); see id. (explaining the
origins of Chapter 867 in the Drug Dealer Liability Act authored in 1992 by a former U.S. Attorney from Hawaii);
see also Illinois Permits Suits Against Drug Dealers, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 28, 1995, at A8 [hereinafter Suits Against
Drug Dealers] (discussing the origins of the Illinois statute and its similarities to the Michigan law).
14. Suits Against Drug Dealers, supra note 13, at A8.
15. Id.
16. See Bronfin, supra note 6, at 350-51 (stating that a user would not be able to recover at common law
because a court would probably not view the sale of the drugs as the proximate cause of the injury, but rather the
consumption of the drugs as the proximate cause of the injury, and that the dzaler/user relationship is similar to the
relationship between servers of alcohol, "dram shops," and their patrons, where the server of alcohol was not held
liable for injuries to the patron); cf King v. Henkie, 80 Ala. 505, 510 (1876) (holding that the death of the deceased
was not caused by the wrongful acts of the defendants in selling the whiskey, but by the plaintiff's act in drinking
the whiskey after it was sold to him); Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, Inc., 725 P.2d 300, 302 (Okla. 1986)
(holding that the death was not caused by the sale of alcohol); El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex.
1987) (stating that tavern owners were not liable for injuries suffered by their patrons, but that the consumption of
alcohol was the sole proximate cause of the injuries, and not the sale or service of the alcohol).
17. See Bronfin, supra note 6, at 351 (explaining that under common law "dram shop" liability, third pairtes
injured by intoxicated patrons cannot recover from the tavern owner so it is unlikely that a third party would be able
to collect from a drug dealer because the court would likely see the injury as too unpredictable for the drug dealer
to foresee).
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patron, which is similar to the relationship between a drug server or dealer and a drug
user, has generally abrogated the liability imposed on bar or social hosts for fur-
nishing alcoholic beverages to their guests.18
California case law, in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 19 holds that, under certain
circumstances, a producer of a fungible product may be held civilly liable for
damages caused by that product sold by the producer on the basis of its portion of the
market share of that product.2 In Sindell, the California Supreme Court held that
manufacturers of the drug diethylstilbesterol (DES) could be held liable on a pro-
portionate basis, based on their market share, without proving that the defendant's
product was the direct cause of the plaintiff's injuries.21 Under this rule, a
pharmaceutical manufacturer who sold thirty percent of the DES in that manu-
facturer's territory could be held liable for thirty percent of the plaintiff's damages
based on that drug maker's market share.22 This rule has been narrowly applied, and
has not been used against a manufacturer of an illegal controlled substance.
Chapter 867 enacts the Drug Dealer Liability Act which creates three distinct
causes of action. First, it allows a claim by the individual drug user against the
person who directly furnished the controlled substance to the plaintiff, provided that
the plaintiff personally discloses all of the information known regarding the sources
of illegal controlled substances to narcotics enforcement authorities.24 Second,
18. See id. (comparing the liability of drug dealers to servers of alcohol); see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 25602(b) (West 1985) (stating that servers of alcoholic beverages are not liable for injuries suffered as a result
of its consumption); id. § 25602(c) (West 1985) (explaining that the consumption of alcohol is the proximate cause
of the injury, not the service of alcohol).
19. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
20. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611,607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144 (explaining the rule as applied in
this case in which the product that was produced, DES, was identical to all other DES and due to no fault of the
plaintiff, the court is unable to determine who may have produced the product); see also U.C.C. § 1-201(17) (1991)
(defining "fungible goods" as goods of which any unit is by nature or usage of trade the equivalent of any other
unit).
21. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
22. See SENATE COMMrrTEEON CRwNAL PROCEDURE, COMMrrITEE ANALYSTS OF SB 1754, at 2 (June 11,
1996) (giving an example of how Sindell's ruling is applied).
23. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11705(b) (enacted by Chapter 867) (creating a cause of action
against the seller or the market participant); see id. § 11706 (enacted by Chapter 867) (creating a cause of action
for the individual user); see also SENATE RULES COMMrrrEE, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1754, at 2 (June 17,
1996) (explaining the causes of action allowed).
24. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11705(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 867) (creating a cause of action
for "[a] parent, legal guardian, child, spouse, or sibling of the individual controlled substance user"); id. §
11705(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 867) (creating a cause of action for a person exposed to an illegal controlled
substance in utero); id. § 1 1706(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 867) (requiring that the individual bringing the cause of
action has not used an illegal controlled substance within 30 days prior to the filing ofthe action); id. § 11706(a)(3)
(enacted by Chapter 867) (requiring the individual to remain free from "use of an illegal controlled substance
throughout the pendency of the action"); see also id. § 11703() (enacted by Chapter 867) (defining "specified
controlled substance" as cocaine, phencyclidine, heroin, methamphetamine, or any other illegal controlled substance
that the manufacture, cultivation, importation into this state, transportation, possession for sale, sale, furnishing,
administering, or giving away is a violation of California Health and Safety Code §§ 11351, 11352, 11358, 11359,
11360,11378.5,11379.5, or 11383).
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Chapter 867 permits a suit by a person or entity who has suffered any economic or
noneconomic damages against the party who directly furnished the illegal controlled
substance to the individual causing the injury.25 Third, it allows an action by a person
or an entity suffering an injury against a person who knowingly participated in the
marketing of illegal controlled substance if all of the following three criteria are
met.26 The first requirement is that the defendant's place of participation in the illegal
drug market must be in the same city, county, or unincorporated area of the county
as the drug user's place of illegal activity." The second condition is that the
defendant must have been convicted of an offense for the same type of specified
controlled substance used by the person causing the injury.g The final requirement
is that the defendant must have knowingly participated in the marketing of illegal
drugs at any time during the period the individual user illegally used the controlled
substance.29
The market liability under Chapter 867 is much broader than Sindell, where the
liability was a true market share, while under Chapter 867 it is placed according to
four brackets of liability which may have no true correlation to one's market share. 3
A defendant's participation in the marketing of illegal controlled substances will be
rebuttably presumed responsible for the following amounts: twenty-five percent of
the damages for a level one offense,1 fifty percent of the damages for a level two
25. Id. § 11705(a)(3) (enacted by Chapter 867); see id. (creating a cause of action for employers of
individual users of a controlled substance); id. § 1 1705(a)(4) (enacted by Chapter 867) (establishing a cause of
action for a medical facility, insurer, or any entity that funds a drug treatment program or employee assistance
program for the individual user or that otherwise expends money on behalf of the individual user of an illegal
controlled substance); id. (excluding all public agencies other than a public agency medical center from the entities
that have a cause of action under this division); id. § 11705(a)(5) (enacted by Chapter 867) (establishing a cause
of action for a person injured as a result of the willful, reckless, or negligent actions of an illegal controlled
substance user).
26. Id. § 11705(b)(2) (enacted by Chapter 867); see id. (setting forth "knowingly participated in the
marketing of illegal controlled substance" as grounds for a conviction for transporting, importing into the state,
selling, possessing with intent to sell, furnishing, administering, giving away, or offering to transport or import into
this state a specified controlled substance or a quantity of marijuana specified in California Health and Safety Code
§ 11703(e)-(h)).
27. Id. § 11705(b)(2)(A) (enacted by Chapter 867).
28. Id. § 11705(b)(2)(B) (enacted by Chapter 867).
29. Id. § 11705(b)(2)(C) (enacted by Chapter 867).
30. SENATE COMMrIEE ON CRIMINAL PP.OCEDURE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1754, at 5 (June 4, 1996);
see id. (discussing the differences between Sindells "market share liability" and the "market liability" under
Chapter 867).
31. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 11703(c) (enacted by Chapter 867) (defining a "level one offense" as
"the possession for sale of less than four ounces or the sale or furnishing of less than one ounce of a specified illegal
controlled substance," or the cultivation of at least 25, but not more than 50 marijuana plants, or the furnishing of
more than 28 16 grams of marijuana, or the possession for sale of up to four pounds of marijuana).
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offense, 2 seventy-five percent of the damages for a level three offense,33 one
hundred percent of the damages for a level four offense.3
Under Chapter 867, a defendant who has a criminal conviction pursuant to state
laws prohibiting the illegal sale of controlled substances or the Comprehensive Drug
and Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 197035 is estopped from denying
participation in the illegal market for controlled substances.3 6 Such a conviction is
also prima facie evidence of the person's participation in the marketing of a drug
where the conviction was for the same type of illegal substance as that used by the
individual user.37 A drug dealer subject to liability has a right to contribution from
other people subject to liability under this division because of their drug activity.38
A person entitled to bring suit under Chapter 867 may recover economic damages,
noneconomic damages, exemplary damages, reasonable attorney fees, and the cost
of the suit.39 An individual user is entitled to recover economic damages, reasonable
attorney fees, and the cost of the suit, although the user is subject to the principles of
32. See iU § 11703(d) (enacted by Chapter 867) (defining a "level two offense" as "the possession for sale
of four ounces or more but less than eight ounces of... a specified illegal controlled substance;" "the sale or
furnishing of one ounce or more but less than two ounces of a specified illegal controlled substance;" "the
cultivation of at least 50 but less than 75 [marijuana] plants[;] the possession for sale of four pounds or more but
less than eight pounds... of marijuana;" or "the sale or furnishing of more than one pound but less than five
pound[s] of marijuana").
33. See iaU § 11703(d) (enacted by Chapter 867) (defining a "level three offense" as "the possession for sale
of eight ounces or more but less that 16 ounces of ... a specified illegal controlled substance," "the sale or
furnishing of two ounces or more but less than four ounces of... a specified illegal controlled substance.... the
cultivation of at least 75 but less than 100 [marijuana] plants, the possession for sale of eight pounds or more but
less than 16 pounds... of marijuana," or "the sale or furnishing of more than five pounds but less than ten pounds,
of marijuana').
34. Id. § 11708 (enacted by Chapter 967); see id. § 11703(f) (enacted by Chapter 867) (defining a "level
four offense" as "the possession for sale of 16 ounces or more.., of a specified illegal controlled substance," "the
sale or furnishing of four ounces or more of a specified illegal controlled substance," "the cultivation of 100
[marijuana] plants or more," or "the possession for sale of 16 pounds of [marijuana], or the sale of more than 10
pounds of [marijuana]'.
35. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified at various sections of 21 U.S.C.) (enacting the
Comprehensive Drug and Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970).
36. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11712(b)(1) (enacted by Chapter 867).
37. Id. § 11712(c) (enacted by Chapter 867); see id. (stating that the absence of a criminal conviction does
not bar an action against that person in an action pursuant to California Health and Safety Code § 11705(l)(b) or
§ 11706).
38. Id. § 11711 (enacted by Chapter 867); see id. (stating that contribution may be enforced in the original
action or by a separate action brought for that purpose).
39. Id. § 11705(d)(1) (enacted by Chapter 867); see id. (defining "economic damages" as "including, but
not limited to, the cost of treatment and rehabilitation, medical expenses, loss of economic or educational potential,
loss of productivity, absenteeism, support expenses, accidents or injury, and any other pecuniary loss proximately
caused by the use of an illegal controlled substance"); id. § 11705(d)(2) (enacted by Chapter 867) (defining "non-
economic damages" as "including, but not limited to, physical and emotional pain, suffering, physical impairment,
emotional distress, medical anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment, loss of companionship, services, and
consortium; and other nonpecuniary losses proximately caused by an individual's use of an illegal controlled
substance"); id. § 11705(d)(5) (enacted by Chapter 867) (defining "cost of the suit" as "including, but not limited
to, reasonable expenses for expert testimony").
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comparative fault.40 A plaintiff may request an ex parte prejudgment order from the
court against all assets of a defendant sufficient to satisfy any potential award.4t An
action must be brought within one year of the defendant furnishing the specified
illegal controlled substance.42
III. PURPOSE OF THE NEw LAW
The primary purpose of this new legislation is to provide a civil remedy to those
who are injured, economically or physically, as a result of the use of a controlled
substance and to enable them to recover damages from those individuals in the
community who have participated in the marketing of illegal drugs. 43 An additional
goal of this legislation is to shift the cost of the damage caused by the illegal
controlled substance market to those in the community who have profited from that
drug market.44 Furthermore, the legislature attempted to create a deterrent to those
who may consider entering the illegal drug market by establishing the potential of a
substantial monetary loss. 45 Finally, this act is also designed to create an incentive for
the users of controlled substances to identify their dealers who supplied the drugs and
to go after them for their own treatment.
IV. SIMILAR LAWS IN OTHER STATES
Michigan enacted a similar law in 1994, also called the Drug Dealer Liability
Act.47 The first judgment handed down under the statute was an $8 million default
40. Id. § 11706(c) (enacted by Chapter 367) (setting forth a drug user's entitled recoveries); id. § 11710
(enacted by Chapter 867) (stating that recovery is not barred by comparative fault, but diminishes the award of
compensatory damages proportionally according to the percent of fault attributed to the plaintiff, and noting that
the burden of proof is on the defendant, which shall be shown by clear and convincing evidence).
41. Id. § 11713(a) (enacted by Chapter 867); see id. § 11713(b) (enacted by Chapter 867) (stating that
Chapter 5 of Title 6.5 of Part 2 of the California Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to any requests under this
subdivision).
42. See id. § 11714(a) (enacted by Chapter 867) (stating that "[a] cause of action accrues.. when a person
who may recover has reason to know of the harm from use of an illegal controlled substance that is the basis for
the cause of action and has reason to know that the use of an illegal controlled substance [was] the cause of the
harm"); id. § 11714(b) (enacted by Chapter 867) (stating that for a defendant, the statute of limitations does not
expire until one year after the potential defendant is convicted of a criminal offense involving an illegal controlled
substance).
43. Id. § 11701 (enacted by Chapter 867); SENA7E RuLES Com?,rrE, CoMrmrrrE ANALYSiS OFSB 1754,
at 6 (June 17, 1996).
44. CAL. HEALTH & SAFm'y CODE § 11701 (enacted by Chapter 867).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. MicHi. COMp. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1601-.1619 (West Supp. 1994); see id. § 691.1608 (West Supp. 1994)
(stating that a plaintiff does not have to prove that the dealers being sued caused the drug related injuries, but rather
only needs to have a showing that the dealer merely marketed illegal drugs in the community).
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judgment entered in Wayne County by Judge Michael Talbot.48 The plaintiff in this
case was the personal representative of the estate of Felicia Brown, a deceased minor
exposed to cocaine in utero who suffered from intrauterine growth retardation and
remained underdeveloped for the duration of her life4 9 Felicia Brown died after
suffering a massive brain hemorrhage from a blow to the head allegedly caused by
her mother, a recovering cocaine user.m There were four defendants in the case; two
are currently in prison, and the other two defendants failed to appear resulting in
default judgments against them.5t The Wayne County Sheriffs Department maintains
that the two defendants who failed to appear, have sufficient assets to pay the
judgment.5 2
Several other states also enacted similar drug dealer liability acts in 1995,
including Arkansas, Hawaii, Illinois, and Oklahoma.5 3 Bills modeled on this act have
been introduced in Florida, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, and Utah.M
V. POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO THE NEW LAW
Opponents of this bill, relying upon United States v. Halper,55 argue that the civil
forfeiture aspect of Chapter 867 is a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because a drug dealer can be punished
criminally and civilly for essentially the same drug transaction. 56 The Supreme Court,
in Halper, held that the government's imposition of a civil sanction and a criminal
fine in separate proceedings is a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 7 Chapter
48. Traci Gentilozzi, First Judgment Under Michigan's Drug Dealer Liability Act Is over $8 Million, Mica.
LAW. WKLY., Aug. 7, 1995, at 6.
49. Id.
50. Id.; see id. (reporting that Felicia Brown's mother is in the Wayne County jail awaiting trial on murder
charges).
51. Gary Heinlein, Drug Sellers Deal Blow to Seizures, DET. NEws, Sept. 18, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
52. Id.; see id. (asserting that, for example, one of the defendants owns two or three houses and a business);
see also id. (noting that the two defendants have appealed the judgment).
53. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-24-103 (Michie 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663D (Supp. 1995); 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 57/1-85 (West Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-421 (West Supp. 1995).
54. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, CoMmlrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1754, at 2 (Aug. 8, 1996).
55. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
56. SENATE COMMnrFEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMM=TTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1754, at 10 (June 4,
1996); see id. (stating that opponents argue that Halper bars recovery, by the government, of both a criminal and
a civil penalty in separate proceedings); see also Anthony M. Sileo, Note, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments-
Double Jeopardy Clause-Imposition of Montana Drug Penalty Tax Constitutes Double Jeopardy-Montana
Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994), 5 SETON HALL CoNsT. LJ. 1231, 1232 (1995)
(stating that it is well settled that the Double Jeopardy Clause is a constitutional protection against a criminal
defendant being subjected to successive prosecutions by the government for the same offense after an acquittal or
conviction).
57. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49 (reasoning that the statutorily authorized recovery bore no rational
relationship to the government's actual loss which made the imposition of the full statutory amount a second
punishment).
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867, on the other hand, does not give any government agencies standing to sue,
except for a public agency medical facility, so the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
apply to the majority of the statute58 The damages that are payable to government
medical agencies are only for the medical treatment of drug victims.59
In a recent United States Supreme Court decision, United States v. Ursery, 60 the
Court held that in rem civil forfeitures are neither punishment nor are they criminal
within the contemplation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.6 ' In Ursery, the Supreme
Court applied the test from United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,62 to
determine whether the civil penalties qualify as punishment. 3 In applying the same
test to Chapter 867, it is likely that a court will find that the California Legislature
intended the forfeiture to be civil as is clearly stated in the law's purpose, and that the
law is not so punitive in nature as to negate the legislature's intent.4
It is also likely that Chapter 867 will be attacked on due process grounds.65 The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that state governments
create a fair adjudicatory process before interfering with a person's "life, liberty, or
property. '' 6 The Due Process Clause prevents state legislatures from enacting laws
that are procedurally unfair.67 The clause restricts a state legislature's ability to make
a statutory presumption. 68 The Court requires a rational relationship between the fact
proved and the ultimate fact presumed.69 In Whalen v. Roe,70 the Supreme Court
ruled that state legislation could be struck down if it was arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable.7! ' The Drug Dealer Liability Act allows liability to be placed upon a
known drug dealer, without actual proof that the person was the legal or proximate
cause of the harm and without proof that the dealer was the dealer that provided the
58. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11705(a)(1)-(5) (enacted by Chapter 867) (explaining who may
bring actions).
59. Id. § 1 1705(a)(4) (enacted by Chapter 867).
60. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
61. Ursery, 116 S.Ct. at2149.
62. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
63. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2142 (defining the two-part test as: (1) Whether Congress intends for the
forfeiture to be criminal or civil, and (2) if the scheme is so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate Congress's
intent).
64. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text (stating the legislature's purpose for enacting Chapter
867).
65. See generally Drug Dealers' Victims Can Get Damages Under New Law, MicH. LAW. WKLY., Oct. 24,
1994, at I (predicting that the model statute will be challenged on due process grounds).
66. Wendy Stasell, Comment, "Shopping" for Defendants: Market Liability Under Illinois Drug Dealer
Liability Act, 27 LoY. U. Cli. LJ. 1023, 1037 (Summer 1996); see U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
67. Stasell, supra note 66, at 1037.
68. 1I; see id. (explaining "statutory presumption" as using proof of one fact as evidence of the existence
of an ultimate fact sought to be proven at trial).
69. Ursery v. Turner Elkhom Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 29 (1975).
70. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
71. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 597.
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drugs to the user who caused the harm.72 The United States Supreme Court has not
ruled on the constitutionality of market share liability; so it is unclear if it will be
upheld.73
It is also likely that the courts will find a rational relationship between dealing
drugs and holding a drug dealer responsible for injuries from an illegal drug. The
relationship is rationally related because the sale of drugs does cause harm and
people who sell drugs contribute to the potential danger to the public. Because of the
illegal nature of the drug market and the fact that the sellers attempt to hide their
activity to avoid being caught, it would be difficult for a plaintiff to prove that a
particular defendant caused the plaintiff's harm. The California Supreme Court in
Sindell found the plaintiff in a similar situation, where she would have difficulty
proving causation due to no fault of her own, and still placed liability upon the
defendants.74
It is probable that the Court will take issue at the percentages of liability imposed
by Chapter 867. The percentages of fault in Chapter 867 are statutorily created and
in no way relate to a defendant's actual market share percentages. 5 For example, a
person convicted of selling ten pounds of marijuana would be held 100% liable under
Chapter 867 regardless of whether the ten pounds was an actual representation of
100% of the market share in that county. In a rural county, a sale often pounds could
be a large percentage of the market share, but in a large county, such as Los Angeles
County, this would be a small percentage of the total marijuana sold. The four levels
of liability under Chapter 867 appear to be completely arbitrary. The California
Supreme Court in Sindell allowed liability to be placed because each manufacturer's
liability would be approximately equivalent to the damages caused by the DES it
manufactured; thus it found no due process violation.76 One could argue that the four
levels are necessary because of the difficulty in computing market shares for illegal
sales; however, counties do have records of total drug sales arrests and seizures that
could be used to get a rough idea of market share.
One could argue the levels of liability under Chapter 867 are necessary for
administrative convenience. The courts will have a bright line rule to follow without
the need to find individual levels of fault on a case by case basis. There are valid
points on both sides of the debate over market share liability under Chapter 867.
Therefore the court could rule either way on the market share liability, but it is
possible that it will be found to violate the Due Process Clause.
72. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11704 (enacted by Chapter 867).
73. Stasell, supra note 66, at 1031.
74. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (discussing Sindell).
75. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (identifying the percentages of fault).
76. Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611,607 P.2d 924,936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144 (1980).
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Vl. CONCLUSION
California law prior to Chapter 867 failed to hold drug dealers fully responsible
for the damage they caused through their illegal drug transactions. 77 The enactment
of the Drug Dealer Liability Act marks a significant change in the tort law of
California by holding the drug dealer responsible whether the dealer legally caused
the harm or not.78 The new statute will give relief to victims of drug abuse;79 how-




Health and Safety Code §§ 11700, 11701, 11702, 11703, 11704, 11705,
11706, 11707, 11708, 11709, 11710, 11711, 11712, 11713, 11714, 11715,
11716, 11717 (new).
SB 1754 (Calderon); 1996 STAT. Ch. 867
77. See Bronfin, supra note 6, at 365 (proposing a statute to solve this unaddressed area in the law).
78. See SENATEFLOOR, COMhrTEEANALYSIS OFSB 1754, at 1 (June 17, 1996) (discussing that the liability
is fixed based upon a market share and not based on proof of actual causation).
79. See Bills Signed, supra note 2 (asserting that people harmed may now sue the person who caused the
harm).
